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OBSERVATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL
LABOR STANDARDS AND TRADE
ABSTRACT
This paper reviews the theoretical arguments for and against linking international labor
standards to trade. Based on theory alone it is difficult to generalize about the effect of labor
standards on efficiency and equity. Some economists have argued that international labor
standards are merely disguised protectionism. An evaluation of determinants of support for
legislation that would ban imports to the United States of goods made with child labor provides
little support for the prevailing political economy view. In particular, members of Congress
representing districts with relatively many unskilled workers, who are most likely to compete
with child labor, are less likely to support a ban on imports made with child labor. Another
finding is that the prevalence of child labor declines sharply with national income. Last, an
analysis of compulsory schooling laws, which are often suggested as an alternative to prohibiting
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As national economies have become more integrated, the issue of
international coordination of labor standards has become more prominent.
Opponents of labor standards argue that international pressure on foreign
countries is an unnecessary and counterproductive interference in the workings
of the free market. In this view pressure for international labor standards
represents either disguised protectionism or misplaced compassion. Proponents
of labor standards argue that a set of minimal labor standards is necessary to
promote fair competition and to facilitate efficient operation of the labor
market. In industrialized countries there has also been a growing
undercurrent of resentment toward trade with countries with low labor costs,
which threatens the viability of international trade agreements. In the
United states, for example, this opposition has been galvanized by
presidential candidate Pat Buchanan, but it also has been voiced by several
union leaders and liberal politicians.
The core areas of labor standards typically include freedom of
association, collective bargaining, prohibition of forced labor, elimination
of exploitative child labor, and nondiscrimination. 1 The International Labor
Organization (ILO) has been the main institution concerned with international
labor standards since its inception in 1919. The ILO establishes conventions
that are binding only on the countries that ratify them. The ILO is not
empowered to enforce compliance with ratified conventions; instead, it relies
on international pressure, advice, and monitoring to encourage compliance.
Additionally, several bilateral and multilateral trade agreements cover labor
and environmental standards. For example, the labor side agreements were a
critical element of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) .The goal of this paper is to critically evaluate the case for and
against international labor standards. The next section reviews theoretical
perspectives on labor standards and discusses issues related to the use of
international trade linkages as a lever to influence labor standards. My main
conclusion is that there are valid arguments on both sides of this debate.
Thus , empirical evidence and experience are necessary to sort out the validity
of the case for and against international labor standards and determine the
desirability of linking labor standards to trade policy. The following
section provides evidence on the political economy of child labor standards by
studying the sources of support for legislation currently before the United
States Congress that would ban importation of products made with child labor.
Specifically, this section asks whether there is evidence that support for
international labor standards stems from a desire to protect constituents from
foreign competition. Next, I examine how the prevalence of child labor varies
across countries according to levels of economic development. Not
surprisingly, child employment rates decline sharply with income per capita.
Last, I look at compulsory schooling laws, which are often a complementary, or
alternative, policy to banning child labor. This analysis finds a tremendous
amount of noncompliance with minimum schooling laws in developing countries.
Theoretical Perspectives On International Labor Standards
A variety of theoretical arguments have been made for and against
international labor standards. Some of these arguments are very old; others
have been developed more recently.
2Efficient, competitive markets and the political economy model
A starting point for most economic analyses is the efficient,
competitive model. Ehrenberg 1994 provides a nice overview of the
implications of this model for international labor standards. In this model
the total compensation (monetary and nonmonetary) workers receive equals their
marginal contribution to the value of output. Each country’s economy operates
at a Pareto optimal position — no government policy will make a person better
off without making another person worse off. Wage differentials compensate
workers for the varying health risks and other disamenities they face on the
job. Child laborers are assumed to be paid a wage commensurate with their
contribution to output and to rationally choose between working and pursuing
formal education or other activities. Labor standards in this model cannot
raise the welfare of a nation as a whole, although they can make some workers
better off at the expense of other workers, consumers, or employers.
Ehrenberg (1994) and others argue that the cost of meeting standards is likely
to be borne by workers, in the form of lower wages or devalued currency. This
model is clearly a simplified view of the world, but it may capture some
critical effects of introducing labor standards.
Trade between nations is based on comparative advantage. Countries
specialize in the activities in which they have a comparative advantage in
terms of physical or human resources. The more different are nations, the
more they stand to gain from trading with each other. A reduction in trade
barriers will create winners and losers in each country, although under fairly
general conditions the gain to the winners will exceed the loss to the losers
in each country. If a common set of labor standards were imposed on
3countries, according to this model the net gains from trade will be reduced.
Prices of goods produced by labor-intensive technologies will rise if labor
standards raise the cost of labor. Because developed countries tend to
specialize in capital-intensive goods, this model predicts that the welfare of
consumers in developed nations will decline if minimum labor standards are
imposed worldwide, although the welfare of workers in labor-intensive
industries in industrial nations may increase. (See Brown, Deardorff and
Stern 1993 for a theoretical treatment of these and related issues. )
Why do some industrial countries seek to impose international labor
standards in this model? A widely held view is that labor standards are
pursued by vested interests in these countries (labor unions, employers in
certain industries) to prevent competition from developing countries based on
comparative advantage (Hansson 1983, Bhagwati 1994, and Srinivasan 1994) . For
example, if child labor is used extensively in the textile industry in
developing nations, then textile companies in industrial nations would benefit
from an international ban on child labor. The textile industry in industrial
nations will have an incentive to lobby for such policies. Srinivasan (1994)
argues that [Ithe demand for linkage between trading rights and observance of
standards with respect to environment and labor would seem to arise largely
from protectionist motives. ” I call this the prevailing political economy
view of international labor standards.
Redistribution
- efficient private market may fail to generate a distribution of incomes or
working conditions that is desired by the public. For example, wages for the
4least skilled workers may be so low as to impoverish a large segment of the
workforce. Society may wish to redistribute income toward low-income people.
&y redistribution in an economy that is operating at the efficient frontier
will entail some deadweight loss, ruling out lump-sum transfers. For example,
it is often argued that a minimum wage reduces the employment of some groups
of workers (causing deadweight loss) . But a minimum wage may still be
desirable because the total income of low-paid workers increases if the
elasticity of demand for labor is less than one. The desirability of labor
standards as a redistributive tool would depend on the society’s interest in
redistributing income and on the comparative strengths and weaknesses of other
programs that could be used to redistribute income.
The comparative advantage of a minimum wage, for example, depends
critically on the elasticity of labor demand-the lower the elasticity, the
smaller the distortion created by a minimum wage.2 My reading of the
evidence for the United States, where most minimum wage workers are employed
in nontraded goods sectors, is that employment would not be noticeably
affected by a moderate increase in the minimum wage from its current level
(Card and Krueger 1995). This conclusion may be very different in developing
countries, however. ti interesting recent paper by Squire and Suthiwart-
Narueput (1995) points out that the distortionary effect of a minimum wage and
other labor standards may be diminished by endogenous compliance; when the
efficiency loss is great, firms and workers have a stronger incentive to avoid
the minimum wage through noncompliance or by moving to the uncovered sector.
It is also important to compare the net benefits of labor standards with the
net benefits of feasible alternative policies. Often, labor standards are not
targeted to the poorest in society because the very poor are either not
5working or working in the informal sector, which does not abide by labor
standards .
Much economics research focuses on the adverse side effects of public
policies, to the exclusion of the effectiveness of the policies themselves.
But just because policy interventions may have negative side effects is not in
itself reason to conclude that the interventions are undesirable. These
unintended consequences must be weighed against the intended consequences. AI-I
analogy to medicine is instructive. Chemotherapy is used to treat certain
forms of cancer, but chemotherapy has adverse side effects. To treat these
adverse side effects, doctors often prescribe additional medications, that
themselves may have some adverse side effects. Similarly, multiple economic
policies to bring about a desired level of redistribution may be more
effective than a single policy.
Market failure
Some observers have emphasized market failures, especially in the labor
market, as a justification for international labor standards.3 Labor
standards may improve efficiency as well as equity if the market has failed.
There are several possible reasons for market failures. Information in the
labor market is often imperfect and asymmetric. For example, employees may
lack adequate information about safety conditions. Employers may have an
incentive to conceal safety risks, especially in casual labor markets in which
reputational effects are small.
Unequal market power may also lead to market failure. Forced labor is
an obvious example in which employers have market power and the abolition of
6forced labor would enhance economic efficiency. As another example, child
laborers are often not perfectly mobile, which would confer some monopsony
power to employers. If employers have monopsony power over workers, a
skillfully set minimum wage could increase employment, wages, and welfare. Of
course, if the minimum wage is set too high, it could reduce employment and
efficiency, even in a monopsonistic labor market.
A related issue concerns discrimination, broadly defined to mean the
existence of equally productive workers who are paid different wages based on
characteristics unrelated to their productivity (such as race or gender) . In
a perfectly competitive market there is a strong economic incentive against
discrimination because nondiscriminating firms will gain a competitive
advantage. Yet social customs and market power may enable discrimination to
persist (Akerlof 1976) . The elimination of discrimination would improve
economic efficiency, as well as be morally justified. Swinnerton (1996)
argues that “core” labor standards, such as prohibitions against forced labor
and discrimination, are always economically efficient, while other standards
(such as a fixed minimum work age) are efficient in some countries and
inefficient in others, depending on the level of development.
Externalities, resulting from the failure of the parties involved to
internalize all the costs and benefits of particular actions, could also lead
to market failure. Although externalities probably provide a stronger
justification for environmental standards than for labor standards, they may
also justify some labor market standards.
Recent economic modeling of standards focuses on potential multiple
equilibria (Fields 1995 and Basu and Van 1996) . The economy could settle down
in one of several equilibria, some of which may be Pareto inferior to others.
7Standards could potentially move the economy to a more efficient equilibrium,
or they could reinforce an inefficient one. Unfortunately, little evidence is
available to test whether standards help overcome market failures.
Race to the bottom
One version of the race to the bottom model assumes that in some countries
labor is exploited by the political or economic leadership. Such exploitation
may take the form of forced labor. If some countries exploit labor in this
fashion, other countries will be induced to lower their labor practices and
standards as well because of competition, or suffer higher unemployment.
Echoing Gresham’s law, Marshall (1994) argues that “a basic principle of
highly competitive markets is that bad standards tend to drive out the good.”
Collectively, people in all countries could be better off with a minimal level
of labor standards if some countries exploit labor, and this exploitation
leads to lower labor standards abroad.4
Freeman (1994) and Ehrenberg (1994) argue that, as a practical matter,
race to the bottom is unlikely. As evidence, they note that states in the
United States have persisted with widely divergent labor standards for
decades. This is certainly truer and it is improbable that a race to the
bottom will cause all countries to converge to a common, negligible set of
labor standards. Nonetheless, on the margin a low-level of standards in one
country could put downward pressure on standards in other countries,
especially as the world trading system becomes more integrated.5 For
example, Newt Gingrich and Pat Buchanan both argued against a minimum wage
increase in the United States because the Mexican minimum wage is less than
8one-quarter the United States level.
Consumer sovereignty
Consumers may consider the process by which products are made an important
attribute of the product. Thus , Freeman 1994 argues that consumers often are
willing to pay more for products that are made in socially responsible ways
(without forced labor, for example), and this desire is likely to increase
with income. A 1994 poll by Marymount University provides some support for
Freeman’s view: 84 percent of U.S. shoppers said they would be willing to pay
$1 extra for a $20 garment if it were made without sweatshop labor (Haq 1996).
Freeman concludes that a proper role of government is to provide information
regarding “socially responsible” companies, to induce companies to provide
better working conditions by altering market demand for their products. In
its recent campaign against sweatshop labor, the United States Department of
Labor tried exactly this tactic, to some effect.
Taken to an extreme, individuals in one country may feel it is morally
unacceptable for a country to gain a comparative advantage based on certain
labor practices, such as forced labor (Charnovitz 1992 and Bhagwati 1994) .
Just as individuals may choose not to buy certain products because they
dislike attributes of the product, society may collectively express these
preferences by pursuing national and international labor standards. It may or
may not be more efficient for the government to collect the necessary data to
pursue these preferences through international labor standards.
Rodrik (1995) draws an interesting parallel between international labor
standards and restrictions on domestic technology. Formally, liberalized
9trade is equivalent to an improvement in technology, because trade enables
goods to be “produced” at lower costs. Rodrik notes that nations often
restrict the type of technology that domestic firms can use. Labor standards
are a type of restriction on technology. Rodrik argues, “It is difficult to
see why a particular sort of technology, that which is etiodied in
international trade, should be immune from the same type of considerations. 11
From the standpoint of a worker in an advanced country who is displaced by an
under-age child, it makes little difference if that child works at home or
abroad.
Enhance labor market institutions
Some labor standards are desirable because they enhance the efficient
operation of the labor market. For example, Freeman (1992), Marshall (1994) ,
and others argue that protected collective bargaining could enhance the
operation of the labor market. Piore (1994) argues that labor market
standards enhance the stability of social relationships, and may lead to the
evolution of more efficient production strategies.
Labor market institutions may have positive spillovers to the rest of
society. It is arguable that Solidarity and Western pressure for free trade
unions in Poland had as much of an impact on the rise of democracy and markets
in Central and Eastern Europe as the United States military buildup. Many
argue that policies that protect free and democratic unions have collateral
political benefits. Take the U.S. ordeal of forced labor as another example.
In the nineteenth century European countries made no effort to link trade to
the abolition of slavery. Had Britain refused to purchase cheap U.S. cotton
10produced with slave labor, one can only speculate about whether the bloody
Civil War could have been averted or shortened. When judged against the small
increase in prices that may result from international labor standards, the
collateral political and social benefits could be quite large.
Why Link International Trade And Labor Practices?
Preliminarily, it can be noted that in a well-functioning democracy, the
government would have a strong incentive to set labor standards so as to
overcome market failures, achieve desired redistribution, and enhance
efficiency. Each country therefore would have a strong incentive to choose
the “right” level of labor standards, given its norms, culture, and level of
economic development, because by choosing the right standards the government
maximizes social welfare and increases its chances of being reelected. For
the country itself the optimal labor standards will depend on the significance
of market failures, the comparative efficacy of standards, the desired level
of redistribution, and other factors. Technical assistance and nonbinding
advice may help countries establish the set of standards that is best for
them, but if the political system functions well, outside influences are
unlikely to enhance welfare by interfering with labor standards in sovereign
countries .
M exception to this optimistic conclusion would occur if the political
system in a particular country is not responsive to the welfare of its
citizens. For example, as noted above, if the leadership of a nation exploits
its workers (say through forced labor) , this exploitation will put downward
pressure on wages and working conditions in other countries (although
11consumers will face lower prices of goods) . International pressure for labor
standards could improve the welfare of workers in both nations if one nation
unfairly exploits its workers. This observation underscores U.S. Labor
Secretary Robert Reich’s 1994 position that, if a country “lacks democratic
institutions and fails to disseminate the benefits of growth, other countries
might justifiably conclude that low labor standards are due not to poverty
itself, but to political choices that distort development and warp the
economy’s structure. “
~ one assumes that minimal labor standards are desirable, what are the
arguments for or against using international trade as a point of leverage to
enforce minimum labor standards in other countries? Some trade economists
have taken the extreme position that any policy that interferes with free
trade must be disguised protectionism and must be bad. I have six pragmatic
observations on this issue.
1. Multinational and other organizations often play an
informational and monitoring role insofar as labor standards and
working conditions are concerned. Better information is expected
to political and economic markets work better.
2. If the pressure for standards emanates solely from a desire to
protect workers in advanced economies, the standards may not be in
the best interest of the less advanced economies. In particular,
a concern is that developing countries will be pressured to accept
standards that exceed their economic capacity.
3. It is unlikely, in any event, that minimal labor standards
will provide much protection to workers in industrial countries.
The gap in wages and working conditions for unskilled workers
12between advanced and less advanced economies is so great that any
realistic set of minimal labor standards is unlikely to have much
impact on trade flows (Grossman and Krueger 1993) . If the sole
goal of labor standards is to help workers in industrial
countries, there are probably more direct and more efficient ways
than international labor standards.
4. Ehrenberg (1995) proposes that industrial countries
compensate developing countries to accept and enforce higher labor
standards . Whatever the economic merits of this idea, it is
unlikely to attract much support in industrial countries, which
can barely muster the political support for trade agreements or
for aid to developing countries.
5. Labor standards are often a subject of bargaining in trade
negotiations . Presumably, a well-intentioned government will not
accept an agreement unless, in total, it is expected to make the
country better off. No country has the right to impose its laws
on a sovereign nation. Yet trade agreements are voluntarily
agreed to. Side agreements may help produce a more equitable
distribution of the surplus resulting from expanded trade. The
NAFTA side agreements, which create institutions to ensure that
parties to the agreement enforce their own labor laws, may serve
as a model. Also note that if, as expected, trade agreements
increase national income, countries will be able to afford more
stringent labor standards following the agreements. Since the
demand for labor standards tends to rise with national income,
many countries will endogenously desire to strengthen and enforce
13their standards following trade agreements.
6. Political support for free trade is currently tenuous in many
industrial countries, which have experienced rising income
inequality and high unemployment. Labor and environmental side
agreements are likely to enhance political support for trade
agreements in industrial countries. If faced with a choice
between no trade agreement and an agreement that also requires
more vigorous enforcement of labor laws that are already on the
books , my guess is that even most hardened trade economists would
prefer the second option.
Disguised Protectionism?
Although a major concern with international labor standards is that they may
be used as an excuse to inefficiently protect interests in industrial nations
from competition from developing countries, there is surprisingly little
empirical evidencrnne way or the other-on this issue. One way to investigate
whether legislators support international labor standards in an effort to
protect domestic interests would be to examine whether support for such
legislation is greatest among legislators whose constituents would benefit
most from international labor standards. This hypothesis is particularly
difficult to test, however, because labor standards are typically bundled with
other trade legislation and rarely come up for a separate vote, such as was
the case for the NAFTA side agreements.
One bill that provides an opportunity to study the determinants of
support for international labor standards is the proposed Child Labor
14Deterrence Act of 1995 (S. 706 and H.R. 2065) . If passed, this legislation
would prohibit the importation to the United States of goods produced abroad
with child labor.6 Senator Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) has sponsored this
legislation in the Senate, and Representative Barney Frank (D-Massachusetts)
in the House. Although the bill has not come to a vote, it has thirty-five
additional cosponsors in the House of Representatives and seven in the Senate.
Cosponsoring legislation is an indication of strong support for the bill. I
have assembled a data set to study the determinants of support for this trade-
linked child labor standard.
Specifically, I relate whether a member of the House of Representatives
is a cosponsor of the Child Labor Deterrence Act to characteristics of the
representatives’ districts and the representatives’ political background.7
Plausibly, constituents with a low level of education (and their employers)
are those most likely to benefit directly from this act because imported
products made with child labor are most likely to compete with domestic
products produced by less-educated workers in the United States. So if support
for banning imports of products made with child labor in part represents a
concealed desire on the part of representatives to protect their constituents
from foreign competition, one would expect support for this legislation to be
strongest among legislators who represent districts with relatively many high
school dropouts. To test this proposition, I collected data on the share of
the population age twenty-five and over with less than a high school degree
for each Congressional district.a
Results of estimating several linear probability models are reported in
table 1.9 The dependent variable equals one if the representative is a
cosponsor of the Child Labor Deterrence Act of 1995, and zero if he or she is
15not . In addition to the share of high school dropouts, I control for a number
of other variables. The union rate variable measures the proportion of the
workforce in the state that belongs to a union, based on Hirsch (1994) . Votes
on NAFTA, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) , party
affiliation, the representative’s rating by Americans for Democratic Action
(ADA) , the popular vote for the representative in the 1994 election, and the
number of terms served by the representative are all from Duncan and Lawrence
(1995) . The sample consists of 434 members of the 104th Congress. (The
sample size is not 435 because one seat was open in 1995.)
The results indicate that representatives from districts with a high
concentration of high school dropouts are ~ likely to cosponsor the Child
Labor Deterrence Act. And the magnitude of the effect is fairly large: going
from a district with 10 percent high school dropouts to one with 30 percent
lowers the probability of sponsoring the Act by roughly 8 percentage points,
other things equal. This finding is contrary to what I would expect from a
simple political economy model that says metiers of Congress whose
constituents benefit most from the Child Labor Deterrence Act are most likely
to support the Act.
Several of the other variables reported in table 1 are also of interest.
Firstr representatives from states that have a higher union rate are more
likely to cosponsor the Child Labor Deterrence Act. There are two plausible
explanations for this finding: (1) workers in the unionized sector receive
rents, and unions therefore try to prevent foreign competition from eroding
those rents; (2) unionized workers and their representatives are concerned
about labor rights generally. As discussed below, because unionized workers
are unlikely to compete with child labor, the first explanation is
16questionable .
For representatives who also served in the 103rd Congress, I can examine
the relationship between support for NAFTA and GATT and support for the Child
Labor Deterrence Act. Specifically, columns 2 and 3 include dummy variables
which measure whether the representative voted for NAFTA and for GATT, for
NAFTA and against GATT, and for GATT and against NAFTA. Interestingly, the
results indicate that representatives who supported NAFTA and GATT were 11
percentage points less likely to support the Child Labor Deterrence Act of
1995 than were representatives who opposed both NAFTA and GATT. Thus , those
who opposed expanding trade opportunities through NAFTA and GATT were also
more likely to support the Child Labor Deterrence Act. This finding suggests
that those who support international labor standards are more likely to favor
protectionist policies generally, but the findings for the education variable
make it unclear whether those protectionist policies are in the narrow
interest of their constituents. Below I examine the determinants of support
for NAFTA and GATT to gain further insights into this issue.
Metiers of the Democratic Party (which is defined to include the one
Independent member of Congress) are more likely to support child labor
standards . Indeed, none of the cosponsors of the Child Labor Deterrence Act
in the House is a Republican (although two Republicans cosponsored the bill in
the Senate) . In columns 4-6 I reestimated the models for the subsample of
Democrats. The results for this subsample are qualitatively similar; most
important, districts with relatively many poorly educated workers continue to
be less likely to support the Child Labor Deterrence Act.
support for international labor standards may just reflect the
representatives’ ideology. Unfortunately, ideology is hard to define andquantify. The ADA rating measures the “liberalness” of the member’s voting
record, as reflected by votes for bills supported by the ADA. This variable,
which is intended to reflect the ideology of the member, is positively
associated with support for the Child Labor Deterrence Act.1° Except for the
dummy variable measuring party affiliation-which becomes statistically
insignificant—including this variable hardly alters the effect of the other
variables . Last, notice that the variables measuring the representative’s
share of the vote in 1994 or number of terms in office both have statistically
insignificant effects in all of the specifications.
Comparison with NAFTA and GATT votes
It is useful to contrast the model results reported here with comparable
models of the determinants of support for NAFTA and GATT. Specifically, I ask
whether representatives from districts with many less educated workers were
more or less likely to vote for NAFTA and GATT. The first two columns of
table 2 contain linear probability models in which the dependent variable
equals one if the representative voted in favor of NAFTA, and zero if he voted
against. The next two columns contain the same models for GATT. The sample
consists of the subset of Congressmen who were in office in 1994 and 1995.
Even though the vote on GATT was held in a lame duck session of Congress, we
would expect this sample to be responsive to their constituents’ interests
because it consists exclusively of members who returned to Congress.
The independent variables are much more successful at explaining support
for NAFTA than for GATT.11 Interestingly, representatives with a high
fraction of less-educated workers in their district are more likely to oppose
18NAFTA and GATT, even though they are less likely to support international
child labor standards. This finding suggests that the fraction of less
educated workers in a district does at least partially reflect a constituency
base that stands to benefit from protectionist policies.
A higher union rate and membership in the Democratic party are also
strongly negatively related to votes for NAFTA. McArthur and Marks (1988)
similarly find that a high union rate and union political contributions are
strong predictors of votes for the 1982 automobile industry domestic content
bill, and Baldwin (19E5) finds that union political contributions are
correlated with opposition to the Trade Act of 1974. The finding of a
negative relationship between unionization and support for NAFTA is not
surprising, as the AFL-CIO strongly opposed NAFTA. The ADA rating is
insignificantly related to support for NAFTA or GATT, but in other results I
find that the AFL-CIO’s political rating scale has a significant negative
effect on votes for NAFTA and GATT.12
A consideration of the major players in the legislative battles over
NAFTA and GATT yields some additional insights. Senator Earnest Hollings
(D-South Carolina) led the unsuccessful campaign against GATT, although he did
succeed in postponing the vote to a lame duck session. Notably, a majority of
the South Carolina Congressional delegation also voted against GATT and NAFTA.
It was widely believed that Senator Hollings was motivated by a concern to
protect textile and apparel firms, which are major employers in South
Carolina. The textile and apparel industry is also a major employer of
children abroad. Yet not one of the current cosponsors of the Child Labor
Deterrence Act of 1995 is from South Carolina. Since South Carolina stands to
benefit as much as any state in the nation from a ban on imports produced by
19child labor, the lack of support by South Carolina representatives also
suggests that support for the act is not motivated by disguised protectionism.
A broader literature on the political economy of tariffs also finds that
opposition to trade liberalization is related to constituents’ economic
interests, similar to results of the NAFTA and GATT regressions. Baldwin
(1985) , for example, finds that representatives from districts with relatively
many workers in import-sensitive industries were more likely to oppose the
Trade Act of 1974. In related work Tosini and Tower (1987) examine support
for the Textile Act of 1985, which would have established quotas to restrict
imports of textile goods to the United States. Legislators were much more
likely to support this bill if their district had a high percentage of workers
in the textile industry and if they received funds from the Amalgamated
Clothing and Textile Workers Union, while they were more likely to oppose the
bill if their districts had a high percentage of workers in export industries.
Thus although support for child labor standards does not appear to be related
to constituents’ economic interests, support for tariffs and quotas does
appear to reflect constituents’ economic interests.
Interpretation
There are a variety of ways of interpreting these results. In my view,
however, there is scant support for the most direct test of the hypothesis
that advocacy of international labor standards reflects disguised
protectionism. Representatives from districts that stand to gain the most
from the Child Labor Deterrence Act—those with relatively many unskilled
worker~re least likely to cosponsor the act. Moreover, a higher fraction of
20less-skilled workers is associated with opposition to NAFTA and GATT (see
table 2) . An alternative explanation for these results is, as Freeman (1994)




demand rises with income) and that people with higher
status (higher education) select representatives who are more
placing limits on child labor. It is, of course, possible that
support for other types of labor standards represents disguised protectionism.
But in view of the results for the Child Labor Deterrence Act, it is incumbent
on those who view international labor standards as disguised protectionism to
provide evidence to support that conclusion.
Another issue concerns the strong effect of the union rate variable on
the Child Labor Deterrence Act. One may
result that unions support international
(to raise the incomes
the minimum wage have
example, Bloch (1980)
correlation between a
of their members) .
be tempted to conclude from this
labor standards out of self-interest
Studies of legislative support for
reached this conclusion from similar evidence; for
and Cox and Oaxaca (1981) interpret a positive
state’s union rate and support for a minimum wage
increase as evidence that (generally high-wage) unionized workers benefit from
minimum wage legislation because union workers are substitutes for minimum-
wage workers. However, I
because unionized workers
made with child labor+nd
dropouts from such a ban.
find this interpretation strained in this case
are not obvious beneficiaries of a ban on imports
certainly stand to benefit less than high school
- alternative interpretation is that unions are
pursuing policies that strengthen worker rights generally, rather than merely
maximizing the self-interest of their members.
My own experience suggests to me that union leaders actively support
21labor standards, and that, in many instances, labor standards would not
receive any attention if it were not for unions. U.S. labor unions have
pressed the Clinton Administration to add labor standards to the agenda of
international summits, supported stronger labor side agreements in NAFTA, and
lobbied Congress to increase the budget of the ILO. Yet in many cases I do
not think that the union leadership effectively furthers its members’ narrow
interests by pushing these policies. Indeed, in many instances I am surprised
that the AFL-CIO uses its limited political capital to press for international
labor standards that are of little benefit to its members, when it could
instead pursue policies of much greater direct benefit to its metiership. For
example, in the recent AFL-CIO presidential election, Lane Kirkland was
roundly criticized for pursuing international labor standards at the expense
of domestic union bread and butter issues. This is not to suggest that unions
never pursue legislation that benefits their metiership at the expense of
others . They do. But it does suggest that one cannot leap to the conclusion
that a positive association between support for international labor standards
and unionization proves that unions support standards for the narrow reason of
enhancing the position of their metiers.
Two final points are in order. First, a conclusion that support for a
child labor ban does not result primarily from disguised protectionism does
not mean that such a standard is economically efficient or desirable. Second,
if support for the ban were motivated primarily by disguised protectionism, it
might still be economically efficient. To evaluate the desirability of
standards, it is necessary to examine their actual impact. Are labor
standards complied with? What is their economic effect? Are there better
ways of achieving the same ends? These questions are partially addressed in
22the next section, in the context of child labor and compulsory schooling.
Child Labor Standards And Compulsory Schooling
Many countries have laws prohibiting “exploitative child labor” and the
employment of “very young” children. It is not economically efficient to
exploit child or other labor. Furthermore, very young children may not have
the ability to make rational employment and schooling decisions. Although
left to their own, children may make irrational decisions, their families will
often help them to make sensible choices. The primary economic approach to
modeling child labor is to assume that rational time allocation decisions are
made jointly by children and their families. As Grootaert and Kanbur 1995
emphasize, child labor standards could alter the bargaining power and welfare
of children, while at the same time weakening the economic position of their
families. Basu and Van (1996) note that a ban on child labor will push up the
wage of adults, possibly to the point where families are wealthy enough that
they no longer want their children to work. On the other hand a prohibition
against child labor in one sector could force children into less desirable
activities, such as the underground economy.
The effect of government policy toward schooling on child labor supply
has largely been ignored in this literature. If the government provides
higher quality education, the incentive for students to acquire education and
postpone work will be greater. If schools are not available nearby, or are of
low quality, then work is a more attractive option. It is possible for
children to make rational decisions to work instead of attend school based on
their existing set of schooling opportunities, but the schooling opportunities
23may be suboptimal.
How widespread is child labor? Child labor is difficult to define and
measure. Often, statistical agencies do not collect information on labor
force status for children below the minimum work age. Based on a collection
of data from 124 countries, the ILO estimates that some 78.5 million children
age fourteen and under worked worldwide in 1990 (Ashagrie 1993) . The ILO
convention on child labor (Convention 138) sets the minimum work age at
fifteen, but permits a lower age for developing countries. (The ILO
convention also permits light work for children age thirteen to fifteen,
provided it does not interfere with educational activities. ) Forty-six
countries have ratified this convention. However, the high rate of employment
of children under fifteen suggests a fair amount of noncompliance with this
standard in many countries.
Figure 1 illustrates an obvious point: employment of young children is
common in low-income countries and uncommon in high-income countries.13 The
figure utilizes data collected by the ILO on the percent of ten to fourteen
year old children who were employed in 1995. Data on GDP per capita in 1992,
which are shown with a logarithmic scaler are from Penn World Table 5.6. The
steep downward sloping relationship indicates that child labor declines as one
moves from low-income to high-income countries. Employment rates are highest
for children in Burundi (49 percent), Uganda (45 percent), and Rwanda (42
percent) . In countries where GDP per capita exceeds $5,000, such as most of
Western Europe and North America, employment of young children is negligible.
Cross-country differences in log GDP per capita and its square account for an
astounding 80 percent of the variability in child emplopent rates worldwide.
Child labor is a necessary source of production and income in many
24developing countries
laborers work in the
many cases this work
The ILO survey finds that nearly 80 percent of child
agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing sectors. In
may not interfere with the normal social and educational
development of children.
economic survival in some
others . From figure 1 it
While child labor is considered a necessity for
societies, it is considered an abomination in
is obvious that it would be difficult to enforce a
single minimum work age in all countries.
Another important lesson is that a higher level of economic development
is associated with a decline in child labor. Many goods are normal goods,
meaning that their consumption rises as income rises. Child labor could be
thought of as a “normal bad,” a practice that is tolerated when societies are
poor but not when they are
economies to have stronger
note that according to ILO
wealthy. Thus , one would expect more developed
child labor standards, and they typically do. Also
figures the number of children under age fifteen
who are working declined by 11 percent between 1980 and
this decline may well represent a reporting phenomenon)
1990 (although much of
Economic growth
appears to be an important way to reduce child labor. If trade agreements
increase the wealth of nations, then developing countries that are a party to
such agreements would be expected to more readily adopt child labor standards
after trade has expanded.
Compulsory schooling
Compulsory schooling laws and minimum
complimentary policies. Weiner (1991)
education is the policy instrument by
work age requirements are typically
observes that l’compulsory primarY
which the state effectively removes
25children from the labor force. “ The ILO recommends full-time schooling or
vocational training at least until the minimum work age. A number of authors
have recently suggested that compulsory schooling be emphasized as a policy to
reduce child labor instead of minimum work age requirements. Given the
importance of compulsory schooling laws, I examined evidence on compliance
with compulsory schooling, using data from the 1990–91 waves of the World
Values Survey, a set of international cross-sectional surveys launched by the
European Values Systems Study Group. The survey is designed for international
comparisons, and in each country respondents were asked for the age at which
they completed (or will complete) full-time education.
Table 3 reports the school leaving age distribution for individuals born
between 1959 and 1974 in selected low-income countries, and for comparison in
the United Kingdom and the United States. The table indicates a tremendous
amount of noncompliance with compulsory schooling laws. In Brazil fully 80
percent of youngsters left school before reaching their thirteenth birthday,
even though the compulsory schooling age is fourteen, and in Mexico and
Portugal one-quarter of the population left school before reaching the minimum
schooling age. In India, where the compulsory schooling law varies across
regions and is often as low as eleven, 40 percent of the population left
school at age 12 or earlier. Weiner (1991) argues that the lack of commitment
to a national compulsory schooling policy in India is a major reason why a
large share of the population is illiterate. In the United States, where
sixteen is the most common compulsory schooling age, very few students leave
school before age seventeen. In the United Kingdom half of students leave
school at age sixteen, the compulsory age.
Although there is clearly noncompliance with compulsory schooling laws,
26the laws still may lead to higher educational attainment than would otherwise
be the case. Table 4 documents that the compulsory schooling age clearly has
affected educational attainment in the United Kingdom. The compulsory
schooling age was raised from fourteen to fifteen in 1947 and then from
fifteen to sixteen in 1973. A comparison of the schooling leaving age
distribution for three cohort~ne covered by the age fourteen law, one
covered by the age fifteen law, and one covered by the age sixteen la~hows
that for each cohort the modal school leaving age equals the minimum
compulsory level. Moreover, for each cohort no more than
individuals leave school before reaching the minimum age.




increases in the compulsory schooling age in the United
In developing countries it is less clear that the
age has much effect on educational attainment. None
countries in table 3 shows much of a spike in school
compulsory schooling age. In Brazil child labor and







10 percent of Brazilian
children work for their own or their family’s survival on the streets (Myers
1988) . Brazil increased its compulsory schooling age from eleven to fourteen
in 1971. Yet table 5 shows there is hardly any difference in school leaving
ages for the younger cohort, which was covered by the age fourteen law (born
after 1962) and the older cohort (born before 1958) , which was covered by the
age eleven law. Regardless of the compulsory schooling age, roughly
percent of children left school before reaching the age of fourteen.
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In the United Kingdom and the United States compulsory schooling has
been found to lead to higher earnings (Angrist and Krueger 1991 and Harmon and
27Walker 1995) . These studies find that the earnings payoff to years of
compulsory schooling tends to exceed the payoff to years of schooling beyond
the compulsory level. For several reasons policies that increase educational
attainment in developing countries are likely to have large rewards as well.
First, Psacharopoulos (1994) finds that primary education pays a higher return
than secondary and higher education in developing countries, and compulsory
schooling laws typically pertain to primary schooling. Second, fertility
rates tend to decline with maternal education in developing nations. And
third, infant and child mortality tend to decline with maternal education as
well (World Bank 1995a) .
Compulsory schooling laws, by themselves, are unlikely to increase
educational attainment and to reduce child labor. ti increase in educational
attainment requires the availability of adequate educational facilities,
vigorous enforcement, and a commitment on the part of parents and policy
makers to foster education. Compulsory schooling laws can form an important
component of child labor policy, but unless communities have adequate schools
and families have the financial wherewithal and will to send their children to
school , there will be rampant noncompliance with compulsory schooling laws.
More generally, low compliance with labor standards is often a major
issue in developing countries (World Bank 1995b) . If countries lack the
capacity or will to enforce their existing labor standards, pressing them to
adopt more stringent standards probably will have little effect. Recent
efforts by the international community to encourage nations to enforce the
laws that they already deem adequate seems to be a response to the low
compliance .
28Conclusion
A review of the theoretical literature suggests that labor standards
could enhance the efficiency of the labor market and improve the distribution
of income in some situations, but could prove counterproductive for efficiency
and equity in others. Interestinglyr after surveying the unequal political
power of employers and employees, Adam Smith (1776) concluded that “when the
regulation, therefore, is in favor of the workmen, it is always just and
equitable; but it is sometimes otherwise when in favor of the masters. 11 In
modern democratic countries, however, Fields’s (1995) observation regarding
labor standards may be more relevant: “There is no easy generalisation, and
the ‘less is better’ view is as itialanced on one side as is the ‘more is
better’ view on the other.”
Support for international labor standards in advanced nations does not
necessarily represent disguised protectionism. Although a large literature
finds that political support for tariffs and quotas at least in part reflects
a desire to protect constituents’ economic interests, the available evidence
does not suggest that politicians support international labor standards out of
a desire to further the narrow economic interests of their constituents.
Thus , pressure for international labor standards cannot be dismissed
automatically as disguised protectionism. Standards may or may not serve a
useful purpose, but they must be evaluated on their merits.
Wealthier countries tend to have more stringent labor standards and
better working conditions. In particular, economic development is inversely
related to the use of child labor. The costs of labor standards are probably
borne by the country with the standards, in the form of lower wages, higher
product prices, or devalued currency. Many labor standards are normal goods,
29for which demand is likely to increase with economic growth. Policies that
sacrifice economic growth could therefore have a negative effect on working
conditions in the long run.
Unless there is a concerted effort to enforce standards, and unless the
standards are appropriate for the economic conditions in a country, standards
are unlikely to have much impact. If standards are set too high they tend to
be widely ignored. Likewise, reliance on compulsory schooling laws as an
alternative policy to labor market standards will have little effect unless
they are enforced, sufficient schools are available, and school attendance is
sufficiently valued by parents and children.
From an analytical standpoint there is much to be said for treating
labor standards as normal goods, which are desired and consumed in greater
quantity when income is higher. Although the political economy model does not
adequately explain why some U.S. legislators support the Child Labor
Deterrence Act, a view of labor standards as a normal good does.
Representatives from districts that are higher up the socioeconomic ladder act
as if their constituents have a stronger desire to avoid products made with
child labor, even though such actions may require their constituents to pay
more for the products they consume. Relatedly, wealthier societies tend to
impose stronger labor standards on themselves and are less likely to use child
labor. - important unresolved question is whether there are more efficient
ways of satisfying individuals’ demands for better treatment of workers and
children than pressuring foreign nations to adopt labor standards or refusing
to purchase goods made under conditions deemed substandard. For example, a
wealthy nation could transfer income directly to poor children in developing
countries, admit more immigrants, or subsidize employers to improve the
30conditions of workers and children in developing countries. But if labor
standards enhance efficiency, the cost of exercising those tastes through
international labor standards may not be very great.
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34Notes
1. Some observers draw a distinction between labor standards (such as minimum
work ages) and labor rights (such as the right to bargain collectively) .
Although this distinction is meaningful, for this paper I will use the term
labor standards to cover both standards and rights.
2. competition over rents created by redistributionary policies may also
reduce efficiency, as resources are devoted to rent-seeking rather than
production (see Krueger 1974) .
3. The World Bank (1995b) lists several market failures as a rationale for
labor standards. Maskus, Rutherford, and Selby (1995) provide a simulation of
the effect of labor standards in Mexico assuming that workers are misinformed
about work-related hazards.
4. Davis (1996) provides an interesting theoretical model in which Europe is
assumed to have a binding minimum wage and the United States is assumed to
have flexible wages. He predicts that Europe incurs enough unemployment to
raise the wage of low-skilled United States workers to the European minimum
wage if trade arbitrages goods prices between the countries.
5. Freeman (1994) writes, “I do not accept the premise of some that bad
standards drive out good standards. Any country that wants higher Labour
standards for itself can have them. .. if it is willing to pay.” My point is
that lower standards abroad may alter the price that the country will have to
pay.
6. The Child Labor Deterrence Act of 1995 would urge the President to seek an
agreement with other governments to secure an international ban on trade in
goods produced by children under age fifteen. Additionally, it would require
the Secretary of Labor to identify foreign countries that do not comply with
national laws that prohibit child labor and that utilize child labor in export
products. After consultations with the U.S. Trade Representative and
Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Commerce and at least one public hearing,
the importation of such products from these countries could be prohibited.
7. With only seven cosponsors in the Senate, this type of statistical
analysis does not make much sense for the 100 members of the Senate.
8. This variable was derived from the STF3 file of the 1990 Census, which
pertains to the 103rd Congress.
9. Since the dependent variable equals either zero or one, and the mean is
rather low, a linear probability model is not strictly speaking appropriate.
To partially address this issue, I have reported standard errors that correct
for heteroskedasticity. More important, I also have reestimated the
regressions using a logistic model and found qualitatively similar results.
For simplicity, I report the linear probability models.
10. Results were quite similar when I used the AFL-CIO’s political rating
scale instead of the ADA rating.11. Indeed, a chi square test finds that the variables in the GATT equations
are jointly statistically insignificant.
12. This may result, in part, because voting on NAFTA enters into the
AFL-CIO’s evaluation criteria, however.
13. The data used in Figure 1 were kindly provided by Kebebew Ashagrie of the
ILO . Numerous microdata studies have found that child labor is negatively






Child Labor Force Partlclpatlon Falls With Income













500 1000 ~ooo 4000 aooo l~~l~o
Per Cdplta GDD, Log Scale
Figure 1Table 1
Determinants of Support for a Ban
on Imports of Goods Produced with Child Labor
All Democrats


































































































































Notes: Mean of dependent variable is ,08 in column 1, .09 in columns 2 and 3, and .17 in
columns 4, 5 and 6. Data pertain to U.S. House of Representatives, 1995. Estimates are from a
linear probability model. White standard errors are reported in parentheses. Source: Author’s
calculations.
* Statistically significant at 0.10 level.Table 2
Determinants of Support for NAFTA and GATT
NAFTA GATT








































Sample size 345 345 349 347
Notes : 53 percent of the sample voted for NAFTA, and 63 percent
voted for GATT. Coefficients are from a linear probability
model . White standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Source: Author’s calculations.
* Statistically significant at the 0.10 level.~\o
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Source : Authors calculations from World
Values Surveys. Data have been weighted
to adjust for nonrandom sampling.Table 5: School Leaving Age in Brazil












































Source : Authors calculations from World
Values Surveys. Data have been weighted
to adjust for nonrandom sampling.